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"The prohibition of compelling a man in a 
criminal court to be a witness against him-
self (5th Amendment) is a prohibition of 
the use of physical or moral compulsion to 
exort communications from him, not an 
exclusion of his body as evidence when it 
may be material." 
J. Kendall Few 
Judge of Oconee County 
Civil - Criminal - Family Court 
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EVIDENCE FROM BODY 
OF SUSPECT 
The basic decision of the United States Supreme 
Court holding that it is lawful in certain 
circumstances to make physical intrusion into the 
body of a suspect to obtain evidence is Schmerber 
v. California, 16 Led 2d 908, decided in 1966. 
Schmerber was involved in an automobile accident 
in Los Angeles and was taken to the emergency room 
of a hospital. There was evidence to constitute 
probable cause that Schmerber was under the influence 
while driving one of the cars involved in the 
accident (odor of alcohol on breath). A sample of 
Schmerber's blood was taken at the direction of a 
police officer by a physician over the suspect's 
protest. Chemical analysis showed the blood to 
contain more than the legal amount of alcohol and 
Schmerber was convicted of DUI, largely on the basis 
of evidence of the blood test. 
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The defendant appealed his conviction on several 
grounds, contending that the drawing of blood: 
1. Violated due process of law. 
(2) Required him to testify against himself. 
(3) Violated right to privacy (unreasonable search 
and seizure). 
(4) Violated his right to counsel. (No attorney 
was present when the blood was taken.) 
The United States Supreme Court, holding the 
taking of the blood in the circumstances, said: 
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DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
(1) Breithaupt was also a case in which police 
officers caused blood to be withdrawn from the 
driver of an automobile involved in an accident, and 
in which there was ample justification for the 
officer's conclusion that the driver was under the 
influence of alcohol. There, as here, the extradition 
was made by a physician in a simple, medically 
acceptable manner in a hospital environment. 
*(384 us 760) 
·kThere, however, the driver was unconscious at 
the time the blood was withdrawn and hence had no 
opportunity to object to the procedure. We affirmed 
the conviction there resulting from the use of the 
test in evidence, holding that under such circum-
stances the withdrawal did not offend "that 'sense 
of justice' of which we spoke in Rocllin v. California, 
342 US 165 (96 Led 183, 72 S Ct 205, 25 ALR2d 1396) ." 
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352 US, at 435, 1 Led 2d at 450. Breithaupt thus 
requires the rejection of petitioner's due process 
argument, and nothing in the circumstances of this 
case or in supervening events persuades us that this 
aspect of Breithaupt should be overruled. 
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SELF- INCRIMINATION 
THE PROTECTION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION APPLIES TO COMMUNICATIONS 
FROM THE ACCUSED, NOT TO EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT 
BE OBTAINED FROM THE SUSPECT'S PHYSICAL BODY. 
"(T)he prohibition of compelling a man in a 
criminal court to be witness against himself is a 
prohibition of the use of physical or moral 
compulsion to exort communications from him, not an 
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be 
material. The objection in principle would forbid 
a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features 
with a photograph in proof." 218 US, at 252-253, 54 
Led at 1030. 
It is clear that the protection of the privilege 
reaches an accused's communications, whatever form 
they might take, and the compulsion of responses 
which are also communications, for example, compliance 
-9-
with a subpoena to produce one's papers. Boyd v. 
United States, 116 US 616, 29 Led 746, 6 S Ct 524. On 
the other hand, both federal and state courts have 
usually held that it offers no protection against 
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, 
or measurements, to write or speak for identification, 
to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to 
walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction 
which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, 
is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 
"communications" or "testimony", but that compulsion 
which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real 
or physical evidence" does not violate it. 
Although we agree that this distinction is a 
helpful framework for analysis, we are not to be 
understood to agree with past applications in all 
instances. There will be many cases in which such 
a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests 
seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence", 
for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in 
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body function during interrogation, may actually be 
directed to eliciting responses which are essentially 
testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing 
in which an effort will be made to determine his 
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological 
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the 
spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such 
situations call to mind the principle that the 
protection of the privilege "is as broad as the 
mischief against which it seeks to guard", Counselman 
v. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 562, 35 Led 1110, 1114, 12 S Ct 
195. 
In the present case, however, no such problem 
of application is presented. Not even a shadow of 
testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication 
by the accused was involved either in the extraction 
or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial 
capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his 
participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to 
the results of the test, which depend on chemical 
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analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test 
evidence, although an incriminating product of 
compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor 
evidence relating to some communicative act or 
writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible 
on privilege grounds. 
NOTES FROM 
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
CHARLES E. TORCIA 
13TH EDITION 
In Schmerber v. California, a prosecution for 
driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, the accused had been arrested 
at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident and, at the 
direction of a police officer, a blood sample was 
withdrawn from the accused's body by a physician, 
despite the accused's refusal, on the advice of 
counsel, to submit to the test. Chemical analysis 
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of the sample disclosed such a percentage by weight 
of alcohol in his blood as to indicate intoxication, 
and the analysis report was admitted in evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that, inter 
alia, the accused's privilege against self-
incrimination had not been violated. The court 
observed that "the privilege is a bar against com-
pelling 'communications' or 'testimony', but that 
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the 
source of 'real or physical evidence' does not 
violate it. 
Similarly, it may be shown that the accused, at 
the time of his arrest, had blood spots on him; 
appeared intoxicated; had injection marks on his arm; 
or had a bitten tongue. Moreover, under appropriate 
circumstances, the accused may be subjected to a 
physical or mental examination. 
For the purpose of identification, an accused 
may be required to wear clothing alleged to have been 
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worn by the actor; to appear in a police lineup; to 
give a demonstration of his yoice; to provide a 
sample of his handwriting; to submit to the taking 
of his photograph; to provide scrapings from his 
fingernails for comparison with tissue from the body 
of the victim; to provide a sample of his blood; to 
submit to the taking of fingerprints, palm prints, 
or footprints; to make tracks for the purpose of 
comparison with tracks found at the scene of the 
crime, or to put his foot in such tracks; to 
surrender his shoes for the purpose of comparison 
with certain tracks; to submit to a paraffin test to 
determine whether he had recently fired a gun; to 
wear sunglasses alleged to have been worn by the 
actor; to appear at the scene of the crime; to be 
examined after his beard has grown; to expose his 
hands to special light to detect tracing powder; to 
place his hands under ultraviolet light to reveal 
fluorescence from fluorescein powder which had been 
dusted over a bank's stolen moneybags; to provide a 
sample of his hair; to rub his head with a paper 
tJ 
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towel in order to obtain a sample of silver particles 
observed in his hair; or to remove a bandage to show 
the condition of his hand. The weight to be accorded 
the results of an examination or test is for the jury 
to determine. 
At the trial itself, an accused may be required 
to stand so that he may be observed; to remove a 
veil, visor, mask, or glasses; to exhibit his hands; 
to roll up his sleeve to show a tattoo; to submit to 
the taking of his fingerprints; to remove his coat 
and shirt to show scars; to allow inspection of his 
face for identifying marks; to move his feet into 
view; or to put on a garmet, hat, or cap. If the 
accused has testified on his own behalf, he may be 
required, on cross-examination, to roll up his 
sleeve to show a wound; to allow his feet to be 
measured; to demonstrate certain actions or positions; 
to pronounce certain words; or to provide a sample of 
his handwriting. 
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BALLISTICS 
A witness, who is sufficiently qualified by 
training and experience to state an expert opinion 
on the subject of ballistics, may identify the gun 
from which a bullet or cartridge was fired, by 
making a comparison between the markings on a test 
bullet or cartridge and those on the bullet or 
cartridge connected with the crime charged. In 
making such a comparison, the expert may enlist 
the aid of a microscope, a microscopic magnifying 
glass, or photographs. The weight of such expert 
testimony is for the jury to determine. 
) 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
"Since the petitioner (defendant) was not 
entitled to assert the privilege (against 
self-incrimination), he has no greater right 
because counsel erroneously advised him that 
he could assert it." 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
"The interests in human dignity and privacy 
which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid 
any such intrusions (into the body) on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be 
obtained." 
"The Fourth Amendment's proper function is 
to constrain, not against all intrusions as 
such, but against intrusions which are not 
justified in the circumstances, or which are 
made in an improper manner." 
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PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
Where physical evidence such as a bullet or gun 
is involved in a case, the prosecutor must be able 
to prove each step of its possession as well as the 
positive identity of the evidence. 
For example, it is not enough to say that a 
certain bullet "looks like" the same one taken from 
a dead body, or that it "appears to be the same 
bullet". There must be proof that it is the same 
bullet. The only way in which positive identification 
can be established without substantial doubt is for 
the police officer or pathologist to place a 
distinctive mark on the bullet itself (preferably 
the base ..• so that rifle markings will not be dis-
turbed). 
It is better when the bullet is marked for some 
other person to observe the marking in the event the 
one doing the marking should be unable to testify 
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for some reason. Also, it is better for an officer 
to observe the bullet being removed, so that there 
will be two persons ..• the doctor and the officer .•• 
who can testify that the evidence bullet was the 
one removed from the body. Otherwise, should some-
thing happen to the pathologist, it could not be 
proven in court that such was the fact. Such a 
break in the chain of evidence could lose a case. 
Some evidence, such as blood, cannot be marked 
independently, of course. With such substances, it 
is particularly important that continuity of 
possession of the container be maintained intact. 
One brief period when possession cannot be accounted 
for might well be sufficient to rule out such 
evidence. 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ... Chapter 107: 
ASAP AND FENNELL 
Did the Fennell case, holding that DUI charges 
could not be 'reduced', affect application of the 
ASAP program? Not necessarily! The Fennell decision 
said nothing more than that a magistrate or municipal 
judge must try the case upon the charge preferred by 
the traffic ticket or arrest warrant. The trial 
judge does not have the power to accept a plea to a 
lesser offense. 
Fennell does not forbid an arresting officer, 
if his chief permits it, to nol pros the original 
DUI charge and write another ticket preferring 
another charge. The Notebook is not recommending 
or condemming such procedure. This comment is 
intended to do nothing more than clarify the question 
that has arisen since Fennell. 
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When an officer agrees to nol pros the DUI 
charge and substitute another on a new traffic ticket 
under the ASAP program, he should see that the 
original ticket is voided and not certified to the 
State Highway Department as a DUI conviction. Only 
the final charge should be certified to the Depart-
ment. 
The decision in the Fennell case was that a 
trial judge (magistrate or municipal judge) cannot 
accept a plea to a lesser offense over the objection 
of the arresting officer. 
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CONFISCATION OF CAR 
Confiscation of motor vehicles used in illegal 
drug transportation is much more servere under 
Federal law than under the law of South Carolina .•. 
A Lincoln Continental Mark III was impounded by 
Federal officers in Missouri .•• the driver, who did 
not own the car, was caught with heroin on his 
person while driving. The owner, who could not be 
tied into the violation moved to have his car 
returned to him •.. The Federal Court held that the 
car was properly confiscated. USv. One 1971Lincoln, 
460 F2d 273. 
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TIP FROM UNKNOWN INFORMER 
Police received telephone tip from unknown 
informer that drug drop would be made at a certain 
place and time, describing the car and driver .•• 
police staked out the scene and saw the described 
car and driver arrive as the caller said ... they 
approached the car and saw a brown paper bag in the 
back seat .•• they seized the bag without a warrant, 
found cocaine in it, and arrested the driver. 
A Federal court held the search and seizure 
lawful, even tho the informer was not known to be 
reliable, saying that the facts verified information 
furnished by the unknown caller. Canal Zone v. W., 
460 F2d 1402. 
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INFORMER AFFIDAVITS 
The lawfulness of an informer affidavit for 
a search warrant must be tested by the following 
requirements: 
1. Is the informer reliable? 
2. How does the officer know the informer is 
reliable? 
3. What are the facts known to the informer to 
constitute probable cause? 
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EXAMPLE AFFIDAVIT: 
1. The informer is known by the affiant to be 
reliable because the informer has been known by the 
affiant for two years, and during such period of 
time such informer has given the affiant information 
as to the location of drugs on scores of occasions, 
and such information has proved to be generally 
reliable. 
2. The informer stated to the affiant that he saw 
packets of heroin being sold in the kitchen of the 
subject premises within the past two days by the 
suspect, who is known to the informer as a dealer 
in unlawful drugs. 
Ref.: LeDent v. Wolff, 460 F2d 1001. 
A mere statement that the informer is reliable 
is not enough. US v. Harris, 2 9 Led 723. 
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TRUNK SEARCH OF CAR 
AFTER SMELLING MARIJUANA 
Officers stopped car and smelled odor of 
marijuana, but saw no container or other sign of 
drugs in the car ..• they took key and opened the 
trunk finding marijuana. Federal court held that 
odor was sufficient cause to search trunk without 
a warrant. US v. Capps, 460 F2d 316. 
ARREST ON SUSPICION 
Traffic officers saw a truck on the highway 
that aroused their suspicions ••• they followed on a 
deserted highway until it was driven to the left of 
center for a short distance .•• the truck was stopped 
and the driver placed under arrest, the other 
occupant of the truck being told to follow the 
police car back to town. While proceeding to town, 
second driver of truck was seen to throw something 
on side of road. It proved to be marijuana. Search 
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warrant was secured for truck and 1200 pounds of 
marijuana was found. 
Federal Court Ruling: Initial arrest was un-
lawful because arrest for traffic violation was 
nothing more than a pretense to stop the truck. 
Anything that was found thereafter as a result of 
the stop was 'fruit of the poison tree' and could 
not be used. Conviction reversed. US v. Borcich, 
460 F2d 1391. 
DISPLAY OF EXPIRED LICENSE 
PLATE ON FRONT OF VEHICLE 
The State Highway Department, upon advise of 
the State Attorney General's Office, has ruled that 
a motor vehicle owner may lawfully display an expired 
license plate on the front of his vehicle .•• many 
motorists wish to continue display of personalized 
plate on front •.• OK to do so! 
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